Egyptian Chess Match

It’s hard to follow the situation in Egypt without emotion.  The last few days were spent glued to my television and computer.  But it is in these situations that cooler heads prevail. 

Egypt is on the brink of revolution—if not already there.  Mubarak, the 30 year dictator, has refused to step down, while the people have refused to leave the streets until he does.  Something has to give.

All the while, international response has been remarkably muted.  President Obama has been seen as less than enthusiastic about supporting demonstrations against Mubarak.  As disappointing as this is—the tepid response from the White House—one has to realize how strategically important Egypt is.  It is a vital national interest to the United States; a key ally in the US’s Middle East policy.  Stability is essential.

On the other hand, the US has the opportunity to be on the right side of history in the Middle East for the first time in many years.  The longer Obama takes to decide on which side he stands, the longer he gives the impression he stands with Mubarak.  President Carter’s inability to recognize the Shah of Iran’s failures and imminent downfall hurt us 30 years ago; we can ill afford to make the same mistake in Egypt. 

But, I understand Obama’s hesitation.  Events on the ground in Egypt don’t lend themselves clear conclusions, except that Mubarak has to go.  No clear leadership apparatus has emerged from among the protesters.  No clear indicator of the new government’s make-up.  So it’s difficult for Obama and his advisers to formulate a message. 

Obama also has to contend with other regional allies who could be threatened by their own internal opposition.  Even tacit support by the US of the Egyptian protests could threaten stability in the region.  Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Qatar all face serious opposition to the ruling parties or monarchs.  Of even greater immediate concern is the security of the US’s biggest ally in the region—Israel.  Will the protests and the ensuing unrest threaten to unravel the positive relationship between Egypt and Israel?  Will further protests throughout the region force a new approach by Israel’s neighbors? 

Calling on democratic reforms in the region could give anti-US groups political power.  The last time the US called on a government to hold elections, Hamas took Gaza.  The old adage, “Be careful what you wish for,” comes to mind.  It doesn’t help that Mubarak has been playing into those fears by telling US administrations he’s keeping out the Islamists. 

But, this situation bears some parallels to 1978-79 Iran.  We remained blind to the weight and momentum of the anti-Shah protests.  President Carter even went so far as to call the Shah a beacon of stability and progress.  Our inability to recognize the writing on the wall cost us an opportunity to build a relationship with the Islamic Republic; all because we were afraid of upsetting the Shah. 

So, therein lies the problem, politics—both global and domestic—is, like my friend says, “a chess match.”  Except in this case, each piece is important, with known and unknown potential, full of misconceptions, fraught with pitfalls based on those misconceptions, and with perpetually changing roles and positions. 

If Obama “stays the course,” we’ll lose the battle for the Arab street—Muslim, Christian, secular, religious.  Another colleague said his response is a lot like asking a “woman who’s been beaten by her husband for 30 years to accept him back, because he’s sorry and promises to reform.”  Not such a good plan to build rapport. 

That being said President Obama has to do two things.  First, lend support to the movement—all they need to know is that their movement for democracy has his moral support.  Second, Obama needs a re-evaluation of the US’s Middle East policy.  What kind of message are we trying to send?  Unfortunately, rethinking our message is easier said than done. 

Needless to say, the Egyptian movement towards democracy is going to happen whether we support it or not.  The question is, will we be along for the ride?

Yet another setback in Lebanon

Hassan Khalil, publisher of Al Akhbar, described the situation as follows: “In Lebanon it’s never over for anyone.  You cannot write off anyone or anything.”  Al Akhbar is a left leaning newspaper that supports those opposed to the recently deposed government of Saad Hariri.  (Thanks to the New York Times for using this quote in their most recent piece on Lebanon).

The origins of this most recent conflict can be traced back to the 2005 assassination of Rafik Hariri, father of Saad.  But should we be surprised that tensions have flared up again?  It was always going to be this way.  So, what next?

To understand Lebanon, one has to realize that first it is not really a country in the sense of a western-style nation state.  It is more of an amalgamation of factions--primarily religious factions--who have chosen to come together to form some semblance of governance.  The biggest threat to stability in Lebanon is not the sectarian nature of its politics—although, I would say it does often threaten Lebanon’s stability—but the very fact that the central government does not hold a monopoly on power, aka FORCE. 

Some would argue it never has.  Lebanon has always had sovereignty issues, whether it was interference by Syria, Iran, France, or Israel.  This foreign interference has interrupted any forward progress toward a sovereign Lebanon.  But some events operate as beacons of hope, possibilities for change. 

The 2005 assassination (the six year anniversary just around the corner) of Rafik Hariri looked as if we would witness a turning point in Lebanese politics.  The Lebanese citizens that came out in droves to protest the assassination were fed up with intervention by foreign entities.  The protests were enough to force the Syrian military to leave. 

But, in 2006, indicative of the central government’s lack of control, Hezbollah instigated a brief war with Israel.  In Hezbollah’s calculation, they knew the Lebanese government could not side with Israel and any war with Israel would only bring them more political capital no matter the outcome.  They were right.  All the central government could do was to beg for calm and cessation of violence.  The whole exercise showed Hezbollah was big enough to hold Lebanon hostage; proving the central government could do nothing to contain Hezbollah.

Hezbollah was rocked by the war with Israel, but their stock rose exponentially.  With money from Iran and Syria, they were able to quickly rebuild most of what had been destroyed.  Something the central government had been unable to do.  In 2008, drunk with power Hezbollah made another strategic calculation.  The central government had attempted to wield some power by announcing they would shutdown Hezbollah’s communications.  Hezbollah basically said, “Go ahead, but you’ll have a war on your hands.” 

From May 6^th to 21^st street battles raged throughout Beirut and other major cities.  These battles were between militias controlled by the different factions within Lebanese politics.  The Army stayed out for fear of splitting their forces based along sectarian lines.  Violence ended with the Doha Agreement which gave opposition groups—including Hezbollah--more power in parliament.

Hezbollah as a political force continued to grow.  The current crisis is a manifestation of that growth, which threatens rule of law and justice for the assassination of Rafik Hariri.  By derailing the attempts of the international tribunal investigating Hariri’s assassination, Hezbollah is setting a dangerous precedent in Lebanon.  They are worried about having members named as co-conspirators in the investigation.  So, instead of facing the consequences they successfully forced the dissolution of government and threaten violence if their demands are not met.  After all, they have the power to do so.

In the short term, Hezbollah will continue to gain power both politically and militarily.  Najib Miqati, the new Prime Minister, will be their man in parliament.  Iran and Syria will be empowered by their proxy’s gain and the US and its allies in Lebanon—including Israel--will assuredly have egg on their face.  Justice will not prevail and we may never learn who was really behind Rafik Hariri’s assassination, although based on Hezbollah’s claims since the beginning of the investigation one can easily think they were involved. 

Tension will remain high for some time to come.  Until the central government is able to gain a monopoly of power and force within the country in order to ensure the faithful execution of the rule of law, these situations will continue to arise.  At this point all out war like we saw during their 15 year civil war remains unlikely. 

The long term ramifications are much harder to predict.  An empowered Hezbollah could overstep its bounds and face a steady decline, but I doubt that.  As long as Iran continues to be the lone voice for Palestinians and Hezbollah remains an Iranian proxy (which will continue), Hezbollah will continue to reap the benefits of their position—against Israel and the US and for the Palestinians.  Lebanon will continue to be the battlefield for the covert/proxy war between Iran and Syria on one side and the US, Saudi Arabia, and Israel on the other.  Yes, I put Saudi Arabia and Israel together on one side; their hatred for one another is a rouse.  I don’t feel like the conflict will spread to neighboring countries; Egypt and Tunisia’s issues are of an entirely different making. 

This could be an attempt by Iran to distract the P5+1.  Some say the 2006 War between Hezbollah and Israel was just that; an attempt to take attention away from Iran’s nuclear program.  Or Iran could attempt to mediate the situation in a separate bid to engender goodwill, thus buying them time for their nuclear program.  That’s probably a stretch, but with Iran anything is a possibility.  The fact they are funding Hezbollah (which is an Iranian creation) would more than likely eliminate them as an impartial arbiter. 

Three things have to happen in order to prevent things like this from continuing to occur.  First, and probably most difficult, we have to find a solution to the Israel-Palestinian impasse.  It will be a tough mountain to climb, but reaching this goal will eliminate much of the fuel for Hezbollah’s—and by proxy Iran’s—meteoric rise.  Second, we have to recognize Hezbollah—the same goes for Hamas—as a legitimate political force with a significant following.  Their involvement in any solution would give it creditability, without their blessing any agreement will be doomed.  Finally, rule of law has to be imperative in any future Lebanese state.  Reliance on militias and sectarian organizations to settle disputes in Lebanon will only serve to deepen the crisis.  As a nation, they have to come together and actually take steps toward a state governed by rule of law. 

Lebanon is a vibrant cosmopolitan nation, where under the surface tensions run supreme.  We all have to work together to ensure that there will be no repeat of the 15 year civil war.  A strong commitment to the goals above by all sides will be the only way to a favorable solution. 

The Genisis of My Journey to Understand Iran

I was in sixth grade when I realized I was different. 

We were watching Channel One, a news program for middle and high school students.  The special for that day was Iran. 

I knew my dad was from Iran, but I never really knew that my siblings and I were “different.”  Sure there was the time in early 1991 whenever my sister broke down after we started bombing Saddam Hussein’s Iraq.  She was a senior in high school and someone at school had said something like, “kill all them rag heads.”  It understandably upset her, but being nine years old I couldn’t appreciate the gravity of the situation.  There was also my inability to recognize as further proof the fact that when my dad and his friends or family got together they spoke an entirely different language.  Again, I chalk that up to my inability to recognize it wasn’t ordinary. 

But on that spring morning, Channel One had a special on Iran--a far off land, steeped in a rich culture with a long and deep history of greatness.  Of course, I had heard some of those stories, but nothing connected in my juvenile brain.  After all, I lived in Bardstown, KY—we didn’t get a Mexican Restaurant until many years later (now we have 3, along with 5 Asian style restaurants).  What was culture, what was history, and what in the world did it mean to be Persian?

Channel One contrasted the rich and deep history with the current plight of Iranians under the Islamic Republic.  Women were oppressed, political opposition was suppressed, and the economy was in tatters.  They hated America; the incessant chants of “Death to America” frequently heard at protests was their proof. 

Something inside of me exploded.  Every emotion one could imagine was exposed for everyone to see.  I was at once sad and happy, confused yet enlightened, frustrated but contented.  “Is this really where my dad came from? How could that be? I’m glad I grew up here, but I’m curious what Iran is like, I want to go, but what if I don’t like it? Do they really hate America?”  All of this was going through my head.

My friends started asking questions I couldn’t answer; I couldn’t take it any longer bursting out crying, right there in the middle of class for everyone to see.  Tears streaming down my face I couldn’t explain why I became emotional.  No one knew or understood why, nor did I expect them too.  No one else was Iranian-American, no one else had to face the fact that one half of their heritage was the other half’s enemy. 

That was the first day of my odyssey to learn about Iran.  Somehow, I knew then that it would be a life long journey of learning, one filled with disappointment and frustration combined with happiness and fulfillment. 

Today that quest is still in progress.  I’m closer to knowing Iran than I was before, but each step forward brings new questions, difficulties, and complications.  There is not a day that goes by that I don’t look forward to being able to experience Iran first hand, hopefully it comes sooner rather than later.

Coffee and Caipirinhas: Why Iran will negotiate with Turkey and Brazil

Much has been made about the stymied P5+1 process.  Iran’s recalcitrance has made it difficult to see any way forward.

There is, however, a hopeful avenue toward a solution. 

Earlier in the year Turkey and Brazil were able to negotiate a settlement to the impasse.  Yet, the P5+1 coalition were less than enthusiastic about its prospects.  Maybe they were right, but what can we take from Turkey and Brazil’s success?

On the surface it looks like Turkey and Brazil attempting to usurp the traditional powers, but scratch the surface and we may get an entirely different view. 

Iran analysts—ones that best know and understand Iran—should easily see that the P5+1 will never work.  They (the P5+1) are all former colonial powers or relatively established global power brokers.  Iran doesn’t have a history of positive relations with either group. 

The Russians and British dominated Iran for nearly two hundred years by dividing the nation into spheres of influence.  No decision was made without the approval of either country.  Iran, or Persia as it was known then, was one of the main pawns in the “Great Game.”  Iranians—pro-regime or not—can recite a litany of complaints against both powers.  It’s no wonder why they are apprehensive when dealing with either country.

I don’t have to explain why the US is going to have difficulty negotiating with Iran.  Recent history should be enough.  But, it must be said that there was a time when Iranians looked on the United States as the bastion of hope.  When the Russians and British were using Iran as their play toy, Iranians sought out the US as an arbiter.  After all, it was the US that had been able to throw off the yoke of colonial Britain.  Most Iranians looked upon the US as their savior from the damaging effects of the “Great Game.”  That love affair ended in 1953, when the CIA funded an overthrow of a democratically elected Mohammad Mossadeq.  Since that point, Iranians viewed the US like they did the Russians and British. 

While the other three members don’t have such a negative history with Iran as the three above, their association will make them just as guilty.  The French and Germans have been tainted by colonial behavior.  Iran has also accused them of enabling Saddam’s use of chemical weapons during the Iran-Iraq War.  China’s inclusion in this is a little more difficult.  They have—until recently—protected Iran from the type of sanctions freshly enacted and have been a major buyer of Iranian oil.   Lately all three have endorsed policies that Iran could view as openly anti-Islamic--the French banning the chador; the Germans blocking Turkey’s membership to the EU; and China’s anti-Uighur policy. 

In Brazil and Turkey, Iran finds a partnership in a new alliance that wishes to buck the status quo in international politics.  Turkey looks to redefine itself and renew its once glorious past as a global power player.  Brazil it is the new kid on the block attempting to prove itself to the rest of the world. 

The relationship is and will be much more than coffee and caipirinhas—Iranians drink tea and alcohol is strictly forbidden in the Islamic Republic.  It’s about—and will remain so—the fact that all three wish to strike out on their own.  They want to show the rest of the world that they can be responsible players without operating inside a western dominated framework—a new non-aligned movement, if you will.  The more pressure the P5+1 puts on Iran, the more likely they’ll find Iran becoming recalcitrant.  If they use Brazil and Turkey to negotiate with Iran, while simultaneously attempting to build a relationship with the Iranians (ala Hal Saunders and John Limbert), maybe they’ll find an Iran much more willing to play within the framework. 

But then again who knows, as Winston Churchill said about Russia, Iran is “a riddle wrapped in a mystery wrapped in an enigma” (thank you Meir for pointing me to that quote).  Or maybe Ahmadinejad secretly likes coffee and caipirinhas.  In the end, the P5+1 should remember that Iran “will never conform to a foreign script or its impatient timeline,” as Hooman Majd so beautifully illustrates in his most recent book The Ayatollah’s Democracy.