Wednesday, December 15, 2010

Good Things Come to Those Who Wait

Enacting sanctions on Iran won’t bring an end to the impasse over the Iranian nuclear weapons program.  It will, however, bring the sides to the negotiating table.  Even then forces will be acting against forward progress. 
Iran--despite its protestations--has a nuclear weapons program.  If you have any questions, then I suggest you contact Meir Javedanfar, or read his book. 
To be brutally honest, though, the US has been less than stellar in its own attempts to bring Iran into compliance.  Some have described our Iran policy as “insanity” or “like a bull in a china shop.”  But then again, the US’s Iran policy has never been known for its ability to finesse impasses—neither has Iran for that matter.  As John Limbert, former chief of the State Department’s Iran Desk, says “We zig, they zag.”  The last 30 years has been a tale of two counterparts never able to get on the same page. 
It is a shame.  Think of what Afghanistan could have looked like had the US openly asked Iran for help.  Oh and let us not forget the diplomatically disastrous “Axis of Evil” comment.  Until that point, the US and Iran—although secretly—had been working together.  They had joined to formulate some semblance of a government for Afghanistan (post Taliban) and the Iranian population had played host to some of the largest vigils in support of the US after 9/11.  At this point, isolating Iran should have never been on the table.
Even with their disagreements, the US and Iran should have continued talking.  But, wait, I thought their whole revolution was about not acquiescing to the West, not negotiating with the Great Satan, or not colluding with Western foreign policy?  It was, but the US saw a pragmatic Iran post 9/11-pre-“Axis of Evil.”  The US shouldn’t forget that our “Cold War” with the Soviet Union didn’t produce a break in diplomatic relations.  I would contend, and other diplomatic scholars would agree, that a “hot war” with the Soviets was avoided for that very reason—WE DIDN’T STOP TALKING. 
It is that very thing that former Ambassador James Dobbins advocates.  Even if the US doesn’t get “immediate results,” they still get information.  That information can be used to create “better policies and choices.”  This could help begin to re-build their fractious relationship and after all “Politics is about Relationship” according to Hal Saunders.  In Iran, politics, business, and culture are all about relationship.  Once you are a friend or family, they’ll do anything for you.  It takes time, but it is well worth the investment. 
The P5+1 have to end its “preachy rhetoric.”  Iran will not back down from their position just because they are told.  That’s not Iran.  That’s not Iranian society.  You don’t walk into the bazaar without expecting to negotiate.  Understanding Iran will be tricky, but the only way begin to understand its behavior is if the US begins to build a relationship with it.  That won’t be easy, but who said building trust was easy.
Lastly, the US has to stop assuming Iranians will react the way they think Iranians should—this goes for every other country for that matter.  American assumption that sanctions will cause Iranians to blame their government for their ills is foolhardy.  As Hooman Majd says in a recent article, “people don’t blame their government for the actions of a foreign one.” 
The Iranian Revolution of 1979 brought forth a government that sought to throw off the yoke of Western interference.  By only imposing sanctions, the US solidifies that position.  The two sides have to begin to build trust through negotiations that aren’t simply used to reiterate positions.  An honest dialogue between nations will bring both sides closer to that end.  To be sure, it will take time, but then again good things come to those who wait. 

Thursday, December 9, 2010

Why he's so Moody?

Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is facing some intense pressure…and not just from the outside.
He’s enjoying all sorts of problems.  First, he recently escaped an impeachment attempt.  Second, the economic situation he’s facing makes ours look like a cakewalk.  Lastly, international pressures surrounding the Iranian nuclear program are compounding his troubles.
Saved by the Supreme Leader, Ahmadinejad has to be aware that his head is on the chopping block. While the potential for impeachment is low, the fact remains that the attempted impeachment shows he’s facing major opposition, even among his allies.  Many among the political elite are losing patience with their divisive President.  Additionally, his belligerent rhetoric has turned many of Iran’s allies against them.  The recent UN sanctions targeting Iran’s nuclear program was only possible with the help and agreement of those allies—namely China and Russia.  The sanctions have put increasing pressure on those within Iran who have connections to the nuclear program.  Ironically, many are the same that have sought Moody’s impeachment.
Having said that, the economy is also in tatters giving those politicians some cover for their attempted impeachment.  Really, though, they aren’t fooling anyone; it’s been in tatters for a long time.  The only difference is the political elite have started to feel the pinch.  Combined with UN sanctions, Iran is facing near 40% unemployment (unofficial, but more likely, estimates) and rampant inflation.  These problems are nothing new.  After the Revolution in 1979, responding to criticism over high food prices, Khomeini famously responded, “This revolution was not about the price of watermelons.”  Indicating his revolution was less practical and more about ideology.   Yet, even as the prices rise, many goods remain subsidized (including gasoline and other living staples) forcing the government to spend $100 billion each year.  The subsidies have now become a target for cuts.  Again, nothing new.  Rafsanjani and Khatami each tried—unsuccessfully—to cut subsidies, but chose against it; they decided it would be politically poisonous.  We think the protests after the June 2009 elections were bad; they’d pale in comparison to what would happen if—some say when—Ahmadinejad makes cuts to the popular subsidies.  Just the mere mention of cutting them sends Iranians into a frenzy. 
As if talks of impeachment and the economic crisis wasn’t enough, Tuesday’s P5+1 talks add additional pressure to Moody’s administration.  He has to be seen as engaging the P5+1, while also not be seen as giving in to their demands.  It is a tough balancing act, which is exacerbated by the domestic situation discussed above.  Going further, President Obama has been able to create a unified front among the P5+1 group.  Previously, the US had had a difficult time convincing Russia and China to punish Iran for its behavior.  Now, those two nations have joined the US, Britain, France and Germany in pursuing a tougher stance.  I’m not hopeful of a solution during this round of negotiations, because Moody faces a tough domestic situation and he will have to be seen as standing up to the West—essentially the main tenant of the Revolution.  Although, any solution requires negotiation and they have to start somewhere.  Building trust is important, but Iran’s history of agreeing to something then backing off when the time comes to take action—from personal experience this is endemic in Persian culture—makes a near term solution is highly unlikely. 
The internal pressure Ahamdinejad is facing will only exacerbate attempts by P5+1 to bring Iran into compliance, thus compounding the difficulty of preventing Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons.  Iran’s economy has been in shambles since the Khomeini-ist revolution in 1979; the idea that a nuclear program will somehow help that is a pipedream.  As if Pakistan and North Korea’s experience wasn’t clear enough.  More inexplicable is the initiative by the far right to blame Ahmadinejad.  Yes, his belligerent attitude toward the west has brought unwanted attention, but I’m not convinced he’s their problem.  They’ve had issues since the beginning of their experiment with theocracy.  Impeaching Ahmadinejad will do nothing, but give them a short term respite from the external pressures by the west.  I’m not convinced whoever would take his place would improve their lot.